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Casenote

Municipal Liability? Not So Fast: What
Connick v. Thompson Means For Future
Prosecutorial Misconduct

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Connick v. Thompson,' the United States Supreme Court held that,
under section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code,' the Orleans
Parish District Attorney's actions failed to rise to the level of deliberate
indifference required for municipal liability.' The Court affirmed the
possibility of "single-incident" municipal liability hypothesized in City of
Canton v. Harris' as an exception to the ordinary requirement of a
pattern of similar violations necessary to prove the stringent standard
of deliberate indifference to a known or obvious consequence.' Despite
upholding the validity of the exception, the Court found that Thompson's
case did not fall within this narrow scope of single-incident liability

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1366.
489 U.S. 378, 390 & n.10 (1989).
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1366 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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theorized in Canton.' The challenge after Connick will be in determining how wide this latitude of prosecutorial misconduct may stretch
before running up against the narrow set of circumstances established

in Canton.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 1985, John Thompson was charged with the murder of Raymond T.
Luizza, Jr., after a highly-publicized investigation.! As a result of the
publicity surrounding the murder investigation, Orleans Parish
prosecutors were able to link Thompson to a separate and unrelated
subsequent armed robbery when the father of one of the robbery victims
showed a photo of Thompson in the newspaper to his children.' During
the robbery crime scene investigation, a piece of blood-soaked fabric was
taken from one of the victims' pants. The potentially exculpatory blood
testing results of these materials were delivered to the prosecutor's office
two days before the trial, but the report was never disclosed to Thompson's counsel or the trial court.'
Equipped with the indictment in both the murder and the robbery
cases, the prosecutors decided to try the robbery case before the murder,
principally to discourage Thompson from testifying in his own defense
during the murder trial. The district attorney's office reasoned that a
prior conviction for armed robbery could be used to damage Thompson's
credibility on the stand in the murder trial, if he did decide to testify.'o
Thompson was convicted of attempted armed robbery without the
prosecutor's office revealing the potentially exculpatory test results or
even the existence of the tested piece of clothing." This robbery
conviction was then used to elevate the murder to a death penalty
case." In the subsequent murder trial, prosecutors concealed further
evidence: information that the initial description of the assailant was
wholly inconsistent with Thompson's profile."a Thompson was convicted
of the Liuzza murder after he chose not to testify in his own defense
because of the armed robbery conviction."

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1356 (2011).
Id. at 1356, 1372.
Id. at 1356.
Id. at 1372 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1356 (majority opinion).
See id. at 1372 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1371.
Id. at 1356 (majority opinion).
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In 1999, weeks before his scheduled execution, Thompson's private
investigator found the evidence that may have cleared him at his initial
On immediate appeal to stay the execution, the
robbery trial."
Louisiana Court of Appeals reversed the murder conviction on the
grounds that the armed robbery conviction "unconstitutionally deprived
Thompson of his right to testify in his own defense at the murder
trial." 6 Thompson's robbery case was vacated outright, without the
need for a retrial." In 2003, the district attorney's office tried Thompson again for the vacated Liuzza murder." With only tenuous evidence
remaining, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty, clearing Thompson
on all charges."
Following his acquittal, Thompson brought a civil action alleging
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 198320 against the district attorney, Harry
Connick, for failing to train his prosecutors about their legal obligation
to turn over exculpatory evidence to the defense, known as "Brady
violation[s]."" Before trial, Connick admitted to the Brady violation,
which left the district court to determine the only issue in the case:
whether this failure to train rose to a level of municipal liability. At
trial, the jury found Connick liable under this failure-to-train theory and
awarded Thompson $14 million in damages, $1 million for every year
Thompson wrongfully spent on death row. A panel for the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed on the grounds that
Connick was on notice of an obvious need for Brady training. The court
of appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed the lower court's ruling by default
when it split evenly after vacating the panel decision and granting a
rehearing.22
In a fiercely contested 5-4 split decision in which the dissent read from
the bench, the United States Supreme Court held that Connick's failure
to train his subordinate prosecutors did not rise to the requisite
deliberate indifference for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
thereby reversing the lower courts.'

15. Id.
16. Id. at 1356-57.
17. See id. at 1355, 1357.
18. Id. at 1357.
19. Id.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
21. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1357. Such failures to disclose information are commonly
referred to as "Brady violations" after the 1963 case concerning suppression of material
evidence by the prosecution. See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
22. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1357-58.
23. Id. at 1366.
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LEGAL BACKGROUND

Deprivation of Rights: § 1983 and Brady Violations
In 1871, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 19832 to provide a civil
remedy against the deprivation of rights secured by the United States
Constitution and federal laws.2 5 Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
"Every person who .. . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen ...
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law. . . ." Although the language itself only refers to individuals,
the United States Supreme Court has since clarified that the scope of
liability includes local governments, which may be liable under § 1983
where the municipality itself deprives a person of their rights or causes
such persons to be the subject of such deprivation.2 7
The Supreme Court clarified the bounds of a prosecutor's constitutional obligations regarding these civil rights of due process in the 1963 case
of Brady v. Maryland." In Brady, the Court held that suppression of
material evidence that might be favorable to the defense after a request
for disclosure resulted in a deprivation of the due process rights of the
defendant.' Specifically, "Brady evidence" included evidence that was
material to either the defendant's guilt or potential punishment.A
Brady laid the groundwork for the scope of the prosecution's duty in
disclosure to both the court and opposing council." Subsequent cases
have established that violation of this constitutional responsibility may
provide a basis for civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.32

A.

A Shift in "Person":Monell v. New York City
For the century following the passage of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the
Supreme Court held that local governments were immune from suit

B.

24. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978).
28. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
29. Id. at 87.
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989); Pembaur v, City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986); Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
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under § 1983." This policy of immunity shifted in the 1978 case of
Monell v. Departmentof Social Services of New York,' where the Court
overruled the previously narrow definition of "person," from the statute
itself, as applying only to individuals.35 The Court cited original
congressional intent in holding that a municipality was included under
the meaning of a person subject to § 1983 liability.36 While the Court
extended the scope of § 1983, it was quick to limit the application of
municipal liability to those local governments that deliberately acted as
the "moving force" behind the alleged deprivation of federal rights."
Under this rigorous standard, traditional notions of respondeat superior
would be insufficient to establish municipal liability."
The Court held that an act of a municipal agent will be insufficient for
liability unless the execution of government policy or custom both
amounts to official policy and actually inflicts the alleged injury under
§ 1983.39 This "official policy" condition in Monell was established to
clarify the limited circumstances of liability for municipalities by
distinguishing individual actions by employees with those official acts
set by the local government itself.4 o The result of Monell, which
continues to be clarified by its progeny of cases, was a broadening of the
scope of § 1983 with limitations on the specific circumstances for
municipality liability.
Proving the Causal Link: Deliberate Indifference
The line of cases following the shift in liability in Monell established
that, at the core of every § 1983 action against a local government, a
plaintiff must show a direct causal link between the official policy of the
municipality and the deprivation of federal rights."' As claims alleging
liability under § 1983 evolved, the Court drew a distinction between
cases that present no difficult questions of causation and fault with cases
that are more complex." In Canton v. Harris," the Court addressed
the latter of these situations where a claim did not involve an allegation
C.

33.
700.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), overruled by Monell, 436 U.S. at 694,
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Id. at 694, 700.
Id. at 690.
Id. at 694-95.
Id. at 691.
Id. at 694.
Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 479-80 & n.8 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).
Id. at 481.
See id.
489 U.S. 378 (1989).
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of a municipality directly depriving rights." The claim in Canton was
based on alleged inadequate training that resulted in one of the trained
employees violating § 1983.45 The Court held that a more rigorous
standard of culpability and causation must be found to amount to a level
of deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with which the
untrained employees would come into contact.46 Only when this higher
standard has been met can such a deficiency rise to the level actionable
under § 1983.47
Applying this principle in Board of Commissioners v. Brown," the
Supreme Court reasoned that deliberate indifference is "a stringent
standard of fault" that requires proof not merely of negligence, but of a
conscious disregard of a patent consequence.4 9 This knowledge
component, added in Brown, meant that once policymakers had actual
or constructive notice of a particular deficiency in one of their training
programs, the city could be found deliberately indifferent if they choose
to retain the flawed program.o As Justice O'Connor explained in
Canton, this "policy of inaction" following notice is effectively the same
as the municipality itself violating the statute." As a result, the
requisite standard of deliberate indifference for municipal liability under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides culpability where the official policy and
alleged harm have a tenuous link through various actions, including
training programs."
D. A Single Exception: The Canton Hypothetical
The Supreme Court has consistently reiterated, in the cases following
Monell, that in the interest of avoiding a "collaps[e] into respondeat
superior,"a rigorous standard of fault must be overcome to establish that
a municipality caused a violation by failing to train its employees. 3
Initially, the Court made clear that to meet the heightened requirement
of deliberate indifference it is "ordinarily necessary" to prove a pattern
of similar constitutional violations by the ill-trained employees."

44. Id. at 380.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 388.
47. Id. at 389.
48. 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997).
49. Id. at 410.
50. Id. at 407.
51. Canton, 489 U.S. at 395 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
52. Id. at 389 (majority opinion).
53. Brown, 520 U.S. at 410; see Canton, 489 U.S. at 391-92.
54. Brown, 520 U.S. at 409.
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Under this pattern requirement, establishing the "conscious disregard
for the consequences" needed to produce municipal liability requires a
plaintiff to show a pattern through the actions of the policymaker's
continued adherence to a flawed approach, which it knew or had reason
to know had failed to prevent violations by trainees.ss
In an attempt to explain the extent of limited circumstances in which
deliberate indifference may be proven, the Court in Canton employed a
hypothetical, now oft-cited, where single-incident liability might serve as
an adequate substitute for the pattern requirement." The Canton
court noted that where the need for training alone is "so obvious" that
the lack of training would be "so likely" to cause constitutional violations
by employees, the failure to train alone would be sufficient for municipal
liability without the ordinarily required pattern of similar violations."
The Canton hypothetical concerned the known need for training
regarding constitutional limitations of arrests for police officers because
it is "so obvious" that a failure to train would be highly likely to result
in constitutional violations by the ill-prepared officers." The Court
stated that such a failure to train the officers would effectively amount
to the requisite deliberate indifference under § 1983.59
In Canton, the Court did not dilute the rigorous standard of municipal
liability by deliberate indifference, but rather hypothesized a narrow
range of circumstances in which violation of § 1983 is so highly
predictable that a failure to train could serve as the basis for legal
responsibility.so Thus, the Court opened the possibility that a pattern
may not be required in such an obvious situation." The enumeration
of a specific set of circumstances in Canton and Brown built upon the
foundations of Monell by clarifying the requirements for "official policy"
that can trigger municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
IV.

CouRT's RATIONALE

The Majority: Close, but No Cigar
Justice Thomas's majority opinion in Connick v. Thompson6 2 affirmed
the precedent, explained its rationale, and ultimately rejected the

A.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 407.
Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 & n.10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Brown, 520 U.S. at 409 (citing Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 & n.10).
Id.
131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
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application of, what was in his estimate, a narrow exception laid out in
Since the Brady'5
the City of Canton v. Harris" hypothetical."
violation was conceded by the prosecutor's office at trial, the Court began
by explaining the parameters of the required burdens of proof, under
§ 1983," for Thompson's failure-to-train theory of municipal liability."
Thompson was required to prove not only that Connick was deliberately
indifferent to the need for training of his assistant district attorneys'
responsibilities under likely Brady situations, but also that the lack of
Brady training was the actual cause of the § 1983 violation in Thompson's case. 68
The Court explained its previous holdings in the Monell line of cases
by expressly affirming the "deliberate indifference" standard."
Connick's policy of inaction, acting in his role as the official policymaker
for the local government, could serve as the requisite municipal policy
that gives rise to establishing deliberate indifference.o Following the
Court's "ordinarily necessary" requirement of a pattern in Board of
County Commissioners v. Brown," the Court held that Thompson's
actions in this case could not establish such a pattern because the
previous Brady violations committed by the office were of a different
type than the alleged injuries in the case at bar.72
Next, the Court addressed the merit of the Canton hypothetical, since
Thompson's § 1983 claim was based not upon a pattern, but on the
single-incident liability exception." After affirming the validity of this
exception, the Court forcefully rejected the comparison of Thompson's
situation to that of the Canton hypothetical on several grounds."
First, the obvious need for training, which existed in the police training
hypothetical from Canton, does not exist in the same way with Brady
training for attorneys." In fact, the very nature of an attorney's
preparation through previous training is what sets the profession apart

63. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
64. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1366.
65. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
67. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1358.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1359-60.
70. Id. at 1360.
71. 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
72. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360.
73. Id. at 1360-61.
74. Id. at 1361-63.
75. Id. at 1361. Justice Thomas cited to the unique legal training attorney receive
during their education in law school where they are at a minimum exposed to Brady
responsibilities. Id.
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from the instructional needs of other public employees.7 6 Second, there
is a unique ethical obligation for attorneys to adhere to Brady guidelines
that does not exist for the type of employees trained in Canton.7
As a result of this unique training that the legal profession receives,
"[a] district attorney is entitled to rely on [previous instruction] in the
absence of specific reason, such as a pattern of violations . . . .""
Therefore, the Court held that the Canton hypothetical is inapplicable
because, unlike police officers, trained attorneys are "equipped with the
The Court
tools to find, interpret, and apply legal principles.""
reiterated that the district court and court of appeals panel applied the
wrong standard for deliberate indifference in allowing Thompson's
showing of "obviousness" to prove the constitutional violation under
§ 1983.0 Instead, the Supreme Court held that Thompson failed to
prove that the violation was "so predictable that failing to train the
prosecutors amounted to conscious disregard for defendants' Brady
rights." 81
Justice Scalia's Concurrence:Attacking a Delusional Dissent
Justice Scalia concurred fully with the majority, writing separately in
order to specifically address the dissent's allegations. 2 In particular,
Justice Scalia reiterated the majority's belief that the only issue present
in the case was a legal one and complained about the dissent's focus on
the nuances of the extensive trial record." Justice Scalia concluded
that there was in fact no Brady violation in the case.' However, even
in the event that there was such violation, the requisite causation for
municipal liability was still lacking.' No amount of training on the
part of Connick would have made a difference because the district

B.

76. Id.
77. Id. at 1362-63; see also MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2010) ("The
prosecutor in a criminal case shall ... make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence
or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the
tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the
prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal .. .
78. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1363.
79. Id. at 1364.
80. Id. at 1365 (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1366 (Scalia, J., concurring).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1368, 1370. Justice Scalia reasoned that the failure to train was not the
problem. Id. at 1368. Even with the proper training, the deliberate and willful misconduct
by an individual prosecutor involved was the actual problem. Id.
85. Id. at 1368.
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attorneys are acting alone in their willful suppression of Brady
material."6 Therefore, according to Justice Scalia, Connick failed to
meet the scrupulous standard of causation required for municipal
liability under § 1983 because of the autonomy of his subordinates in
their individual violations.'
C. A Culture of Inattention is Sufficient: Justice Ginsburg'sDissent
Justice Ginsburg authored and read from the bench a passionate
dissent focusing on the pervasive nature of the "culture of inattention,"
which the dissent reasoned was sufficient to demonstrate the deliberate
indifference required for liability under § 19 8 3 .' The dissent would
affirm the lower court's holding as reasonable to conclude that the Brady
violations were the result of standard operating procedure amounting to
official policy from the district attorney's office, which fit into the Canton
hypothetical.' Justice Ginsburg projected a grim forecast that such
constitutional violations for concealment of evidence will continue unless
municipalities are held liable under § 1983.90
Next, Justice Ginsburg walked through an in-depth treatment of the
trial evidence to bolster her finding that a "culture of inattention" was
present in Connick's office.e' Although the dissent and majority worked
from the same baseline test of "deliberate indifference" giving rise to
municipal liability, the dissent's conclusion from the evidence was that
the jury, as the trier of fact, should be affirmed in the absence of a
legitimate contention of error.92 The dissent found that the evidence
supports the jury's finding in three ways: (1) Connick failed to ensure
the prosecutors under his direct control knew their constitutional Brady
obligations, (2) there was an obvious need for Brady training, and (3)
Connick's approach amounted to a "culture of inattention" to Brady
material.93
Finally, Justice Ginsburg rejected the notion of a narrowly-tailored
view of single-incident liability offered by the majority.94 Such a
tapered scope of the pattern exception is not backed by the statutory
language of § 1983 nor case precedent.95 The dissent instead insisted
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1370, 1382 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
at 1370.
at
at
at
at

1371-82.
1377.
1381-82.
1386.

2012]1

CONNICK V. THOMPSON

1123

that deliberate indifference may be proven in many different ways
outside of the ordinarily required pattern of similar violations.96 For
all of these reasons, Justice Ginsburg and the three other justices who
joined her in the dissent would affirm the lower courts upholding the
jury verdict for Thompson.97
V.

IMPLICATIONS

ProsecutorialDuties Moving Forward
In the wake of the United States Supreme Court's decision last March,
much has been made about where the bounds of prosecutorial liability
now lie under § 1983.9' At first blush, a strict reading of Justice
Thomas's majority opinion seems to raise the burden of proof for
municipal liability to an almost unattainable level for an injured party.
As a result, there is a prevailing fear that this ruling no longer leaves
an effective means for monitoring prosecutorial compliance with
Brady" violations. In fact, in addressing the implications of Connick
v. Thompson'00 at a recent national criminal law conference, one
keynote speaker stated that "[ulnless municipal agencies bear responsibility for adequately conveying what Brady requires and for monitoring
staff compliance, these sort of violations and damages are bound to be
repeated."' 0
What remains to be answered is whether, inside of a district attorney's
office, a supervisor is able to now effectively turn a blind eye to known
Brady violations occurring in the office under his watch. In fact, does
this decision encourage supervisors to turn a blind eye knowing that a
"pattern" must be shown in order for their office to be liable? This
impact will largely depend on how the precise issue addressed in this
case is interpreted by future courts. 02 The majority's position that
Justice Ginsburg's focus on the overall egregious acts was irrelevant to
A.

96. Id.
97. Id. at 1387.
98. See Elkan Abramowitz & Barry A. Bohrer,'Brady'ObligationsIn the Twenty-First
Century, N.Y.L.J., May 2011,
99. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
100. 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
101. Rory K Little, Annual Review of the Supreme Court's Term, CriminalCases (Am.
BAR Ass'N Toronto, Can.), Aug. 2011, at 15 (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350,
1370 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
102. A narrow reading of the issue in Connick holds that, in determining municipal
liability for similar constitutional violations of employees under a failure-to-train theory,
a single Brady violation, no matter how flagrant, will not support liability for a district
attorney's office's failure to train their employees.
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this case"o' supports this narrow interpretation because any preceding
violations by the office, in unrelated matters, bring no bearing on the
precise legal question at bar. The dissent looks at this Brady violation
with a view beyond the specific and narrow question that the majority
addresses. 10 Initially, it appears that courts have seen the decision
in Connick as precluding single-incident liability for failure-to-train
claims in regards to Brady violations, but not necessarily for other
failure-to-train claims that the City of Canton v. Harris"oshypothetical

might encompass.106
Making a Defendant Whole Again: The Larger Concern
As much as Connick has left legal scholars and lower courts scratching
their heads over the ramifications of prosecutorial liability, the
underlying issue remaining is how our legal system should best attempt
to make a defendant whole again. Searching for an answer in this area
works from a presumption that making a defendant victim whole again
is actually possible. Sadly, there is the possibility that this notion is
nothing more than a legal fiction, as it would truly be impossible for the
injured party to be put back in the same position they were before the
misconduct. Connick has made clear, at some level, the improper route
for recuperation for victims of prosecutorial misconduct. However, the
Court did not sufficiently address what the proper channel to vindicate
these rights should be. While the prosecutors in the Connick case did
face the possibility of sanctions, the Court effectively left no outlet for
even an attempt at making Mr. Thompson whole again. In the end, this
lack of direction in liability might have the most lasting impact on the
recuperation in the lives of those most directly affected in similar Brady
violation cases.

B.

C. The Canton Hypothetical: What Was Said and, More Importantly,
Not Said?
After the much maligned Canton police training hypothetical became
one of the central issues in the Connick decision, its survival will be a
pressing issue for future courts to determine. More important than what

103. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1364 n.11.
104. The dissent focuses more on the broad implications of a district attorney's office
being able to escape liability for a history of unrelated egregious actions. See Connick, 131
S. Ct. at 1370 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
105. 489 U.S. 378, 390 & n.10 (1989).
106. See George v. Sonoma Cnty. Sheriffs Dep't, No. C-08-2675 EDL, 2011 WL
2975850, at *4-8 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2011).
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the Court did say about the Canton hypothetical is what they stopped
short of saying. Justice Thomas, writing for the majority in Connick,
held that "[flailure to train prosecutors in their Brady obligations does
not fall within the narrow range of Canton'shypothesized single-incident
liability."'o It is imperative to note that the Court stopped short of
cutting off all of the legs to this long-standing, controversial hypothetical
in Canton. When Justice Thomas excluded Brady violations he further
limited the "narrow range" of the hypothetical, but did not eliminate it
all together. Therefore, under still undefined circumstances, the "singleincident" theory still stands after Connick; albeit limping a bit.
Contrasting the Canton police hypothetical to the attorney training
concerning Mr. Connick, the Court first pointed out that there is not an
obvious need for training under Brady violations because lawyers
presumably have previous training on the topic.'08 At a theoretical
level, this rationale by the Court seems to make sense. However, at a
practical level the dots simply do not connect. Justice Thomas's
reasoning is built upon the presumption that every law student is
sufficiently trained in Brady obligations during their legal education.
This supposition does not hold for every attorney working in every
district attorney's office. The reality for some law students, maybe even
a majority, is that the extent of their Brady "training" is the limited
requisite exposure during Bar Exam preparation. When this basic
tenant of the Court's reasoning fails, we are left with an "obvious" need
for training, in line with the principle behind the police training of the
Canton hypothetical.
In an attempt to further substantiate the position that attorneys are
distinct from police officers, Justice Thomas points to lawyers' professional obligations."0o The majority relies on such passages as Rule
3.8(d) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1 o to demonstrate
that attorneys have a unique duty outside of job training through
character and fitness standards."' This "outside obligations" distinction with the police in Canton is flawed as it is based on the presumptive
effectiveness of the Model Rules. While courts may frequently consider

107. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1361.
108. Id. Unlike the obvious need to train the police about constitutional violations, "[a]
district attorney is entitled to rely on prosecutors' professional training and ethical
obligations in the absence of specific reason, such as a pattern of violations, to believe that
those tools are insufficient." Id. at 1363.
109. Id. at 1362-63.
110.

MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2010).

111. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1362-63. Rule 3.8(d) requires the production of exculpatory
evidence and is regarded as requiring more of a prosecutor regarding the constitutional
obligations established by Brady. Id.; MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d).
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violations under Brady, there is rarely any action taken against
violations of this particular Model Rule.112 This lack of enforcement
results in Rule 3.8(d) being practically ineffective. Therefore, the
functional consequence following Connick is that there will be "little to
hold prosecutors accountable for their conduct.""' In reality, however,
these sanctions might have always been all that was on the line for
prosecutors, no matter the outcome of Connick."4
Despite the majority's assertion that the prosecutors in the case were
undisputedly familiar with Brady requirements in general and that
specific training might or might not have been beneficial, the driving
force behind the majority's opinion is a fear that courts will begin to
"micromanage local governments throughout the United States.""5
What the Court is truly afraid of can simply be described by the age-old
"floodgates" argument. The Court is acting as the gatekeeper for federal
courts by filtering potential cases that it finds might lead to an
uncontrollable amount of litigation. Moving forward, the Court is afraid
that if a district attorney's office is held liable for individual actions of
"autonomous prosecutors" then the standard for municipal liability
under § 1983 will be watered down to a level of vicarious liability.
However, a recent article in the New York Law Journalseems to refute
the assumed existence of underlying civil action claims for prosecutorial
misconduct waiting to bust open these floodgates into federal courts." 6
D.

How Subsequent Cases Have heated Connick

Following the decision of the Supreme Court in March, there have
been a large number of cases attempting to determine the shadow that
the Connick decision now casts on potential single-incident claims of
municipal liability under § 1983. At least one court has held that the
scope of Connick extends beyond the narrow set of failure-to-train cases,
which it expressly addresses." 7 Single-violation liability, as discussed
in Connick, is still possible where the violation is a "highly predictable

112. See Abramowitz & Bohrer, supra note 98.
113. Id.
114. If Connik were decided in favor of Mr. Thompson, it would have been the
municipality, not the individual prosecutor, paying the fine for the Brady violation.
115. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1363.
116. See Abramowitz & Bohrer, supra note 98.
117. See Price v. Tunica Cnty., Miss., No. 2:08cv262-P-A, 2011 WL 3426182, at *2
(N.D. Miss. Aug. 5, 2011) (finding that Connick's standard for "'substantially' similar
violations" can be applied beyond just failure-to-train Brady violation cases).
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consequence of the failure to train.""e Further, it has been found that
merely distributing a manual, and nothing more, could serve as the
functional equivalent of no training at all in light of the Connick
decision." 9
One district court in Michigan has implemented Justice Scalia's
concurrence, emphasizing the causal link between training and
misconduct.120 In Connick, Justice Scalia opined that the failure to
train was not the problem, in that, even if there would have been
training, the deliberate and willful misconduct by the individual
prosecutors involved was the actual problem.' 2 ' Justice Scalia thought
a plaintiff must be able to "demonstrate a direct causal link between the
municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights." 2 2 In a May
2011 decision, a few months after Connick was decided, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan relied on
Justice Scalia's concurrence to find that a plaintiff's claim for injuries
flowing from a municipality's actions will be precluded if the plaintiff is
not able to display any other incident relating to the same type of
The district court determined that "[11acking this requisite
claim.'
causal link, even if Plaintiff had demonstrated the existence of an
unconstitutional policy, [the plaintiff's] Section 1983 claim against the
[defendant] fails.""
VI.

CONCLUSION

In Connick v. Thompson,' the United States Supreme Court held
that Harry Connick's failure to train a prosecutor did not rise to the
level of deliberate indifference required for municipal liability when
applying a single-incident theory under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.126 As a

118. Ramirez v. Ferguson, No. 08-cv-5038, 2011 WL 1157997, at *25-26 (W.D. Ark.
Mar. 29, 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (finding sheriff and captain supervisors
of correctional officers liable for a "woeful" failure to train on the handling of inmates with
mental health needs).
119. Meogrossiv. Aubrey, No. 3:09cv-00301-JDM, 2011 WL 1235063, at *13 (W.D. Ky.
Mar. 31, 2011).
120. Freeman v. City of Detroit, No. 09-CV-13184, 2011 WL 1869434, at *5 (E.D. Mich.
May 16, 2011) (finding grounds for dismissal for failure to state a § 1983 claim for lack of
causation).
121. Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1368 (Scalia, J., concurring).
122. Id. (quoting Bd. of Comm'rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
123. Freeman,2011 WL 1869434 at *5.
124. Id.
125. 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
126. Id. at 1366; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
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result of this decision, the scope of municipal liability in employee
training programs has been narrowed significantly in the absence of a
pattern of similar violations. In the end, courts should view the decision
in Connick as precluding single incident liability for failure-to-train
claims in regards to Brady violations, but not necessarily for other
failure-to-train claims using the Canton hypothetical.
T. OWEN FARIST

